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APERTURES IN THE LHC BEAM DUMP SYSTEM AND BEAM LOSSES
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The LHC beam dumping system (LBDS) is used to dispose accelerated protons and ions in a wide energy
range from 450 GeV up to 7 TeV. An abort gap of 3 μs is foreseen to avoid sweeping particles through the
LHC ring aperture. This paper gives a brief overview of the critical apertures in the extraction region and the
two beam dump lines. MAD-X tracking studies have been made to investigate the impact of particles swept
through the aperture due to extraction kicker failures or the presence of particles within the abort gap. The
issue of failures during beam abort is a major concern for machine protection as well as a critical factor for
safe operation of the experiments and their detectors.
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Abstract 
The LHC beam dumping system (LBDS) is used to 
dispose accelerated protons and ions in a wide energy 
range from 450 GeV up to 7 TeV. An abort gap of 3 µs is 
foreseen to avoid sweeping particles through the LHC 
ring aperture. This paper gives a brief overview of the 
critical apertures in the extraction region and the two 
beam dump lines. MAD-X tracking studies have been 
made to investigate the impact of particles swept through 
the aperture due to extraction kicker failures or the 
presence of particles within the abort gap. The issue of 
failures during beam abort is a major concern for machine 
protection as well as a critical factor for safe operation of 
the experiments and their detectors. 
THE LHC BEAM DUMPING SYSTEM 
The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) [1] is 
designed to fast extract beam from the LHC in a loss free 
way. For each beam a system of 15 horizontal kicker 
magnets (MKD), 15 vertically deflecting magnetic septa 
(MSD) and 10 diluter magnets (MKB) are installed. After 
the MKD the beam sees an additional deflection when 
traversing the Q4 quadrupole. The MSD put the beam in 
the vertical plane above the LHC machine before it is 
further deflected in the horizontal and vertical planes in a 
spiral shape by the MKB kickers, Fig. 1. After several 100 
m of beam dump line the beam is absorbed by the dump 
block (TDE). To protect the septa from miss-kicked 
beams a special fixed 8 m long graphite protection device 
(TCDS) is placed just in front of the MSD. 
 
Figure 1: Diluted beam sweep on the TDE. Blue: nominal 
particles, red: particles in filled abort gap.  
For nominal operations the MKD rise time should 
always be accurately synchronised with the 3 µs abort 
gap, so that no beam is swept through the aperture. 
However some failures can occur which lead to an 
“asynchronous” dump, and in addition some stray 
particles may also be present in the abort gap [2]. To 
protect the LHC aperture from these eventualities, a 
movable single-jawed 6 m long graphite protection device 
(TCDQ) is installed upstream of Q4, supplemented by a 
two-jaw 1 m long graphite secondary collimator (TCSG) 
and a 2 m long fixed iron mask (TCDQM).  
TRACKING STUDIES 
A MADX tracking code was set up to study failure 
cases and losses for the LBDS. The code consists of the 
main program, as well as the sequence, misalignment and 
aperture files. Since these studies include tracking action 
within the long straight section 6 (LSS6) as well as in the 
extraction channel and dump lines, most of the sequence 
and aperture information was not available in MADX 
compatible format and had to be generated by hand. Fig. 
2 shows a tracked beam at the entrance of the TCDS for 
nominal conditions. 
Sequence and Aperture 
Sequences for both beams were produced: only Beam 1 
is discussed here, as the geometries and results for 
Beam 2 are very similar. The sequence starts at the centre 
of the Q5 quadrupole upstream of the MKD. The 
sequence is identical to the Beam 1 sequence until it 
reaches the TCDS. From here onwards the extracted beam 
was treated differently.  
A key issue for these loss studies is to have an accurate 
model of the concerned apertures. A complete aperture 
model including the critical elements as well as all 
vacuum pipes and transitions was generated for the 
sequences used in LSS6 and the dump lines, and was 
verified, element by element, against the installation 
drawings and databases. 
Figure 2: Swept beam at TCDS for nominal conditions 
(red: particles in abort gap, blue: nominal beam with 
halo).  
The TCDS is a critical element as its aperture is 
+16.3 mm for the circulating beam and -15 mm for the 
extracted beam, and is expected to be a main loss location 
for mis-steered beams or in case of an overpopulated 
abort gap. The TCDQ, TCSG and TCDQM have half-
apertures of +15 mm, ±13.4 mm and ±21.5 mm. The 
MSD itself has a circular physical half-aperture of 29 mm 
for the circulating beam and a 20.5 mm horizontal, 
30.5 mm vertical racetrack-shaped half-aperture for the 
extracted beam. 
Methodology 
The tracking job is split into four main parts: the 1st 
part tracks the particles from Q5 to the TCDS, where the 
particles are either lost on the TCDS block, remain in the 
LHC aperture or pass in the aperture of the extraction 
channel; the 2nd part of the job tracks the extracted 
particles through the extraction channel to the dump 
block; the 3rd part tracks the particles in the circulating 
beam chamber between the TCDS and Q4 (after the 
TCDQ) and in the 4th part all particles which are still in 
the circulating beam pipe are tracked around the LHC 
ring. The results from this 4th part are not included in this 
paper.  
The time-varying kicker waveforms were included in 
the tracking by sampling the measured kick shapes at 1 ns 
intervals and reading out the resulting kick depending on 
the bunch position. For each step in time a number of 
particles were randomly chosen from the initial 
distribution and tracked. The coordinates of lost particles 
as well as “surviving” particles were saved and, after the 
required coordinate transformations, handed over to the 
next sequence. Realistic random magnet errors were 
applied to the Q4 and Q5 (normal distribution, max. 
0.5 %) as well as to the MKD (1 %) and the MSD 
(0.01 %). In this initial case the orbit was assumed to be 
well centred in the magnet apertures; the mechanical and 
alignment tolerances of the different elements were 
neglected. 
For these simulations the kicker waveforms were 
sampled with a time step of 25 ns using 10 particles per 
time step, for a total of 35,600 particle tracks. Each 
simulation nevertheless took about one hour, due to the 
detailed aperture model used. 
Particle distributions 
To investigate the loss locations expected in the 
extraction channel and beam dump lines at LHC injection 
energy of 450 GeV, an initial distribution of 50.000 
particles was used, composed of large amplitude particles 
in a simulated secondary halo, which represent the most 
demanding cases in terms of particles likely to be lost on 
aperture limits. It should be noted that the output can not 
be taken as input for any stress or energy deposit 
calculations, which would require the use of a nominal 
distribution. 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
Seven different cases were studied, which correspond 
to failures of specific interest for the extraction system. 
The normal random errors described above were applied 
for all cases. 
Nominal case with all 15 MKDs 
For this case only losses on the TCDS and TCDQ were 
seen, and these came from particles in the abort gap (see 
Fig. 2).  
One MKD missing 
This is an important case since this is an ‘allowed’ 
failure which is expected to happen within the lifetime of 
the LHC. Again losses were only observed on the 
protection devices, stemming from particles in the abort 
gap. No losses were seen at the TCDS from particles 
outside the abort gap – however the inclusion of orbit 
errors and mechanical tolerances may eventually result in 
small losses at the TCDS for this case. 
One MKD missing and an additional 1.5 % 
error for the 14 remaining kickers 
This case was included in order to check the effects of the 
temperature variation of the MKD switches which has 
been observed to cause a ~1.5 % loss of kick strength at 
450 GeV under some operating conditions [3]. Fig. 3 
shows the distribution of losses along the dump line for 
this case – the main losses occur at the TCDS due to 
particles in the abort gap, but some small losses of a few 
particles are also seen on the downstream MSD chamber. 
















Figure 3: Losses in TD68 dump line for failure case 3. 
Figure 4: Particles at TCDS with 2 missing MKD. 
 
Two MKD kickers missing 
With two missing kickers about one fifth of the beam 
halo is intercepted by the TCDS, confirming that this 
failure case is ‘beyond design’. Fig. 4 shows the particle 
positions at the TCDS for this case. 
Nominal kick with MSD failure of 10-3 and 10-2 
These failures were included to check the effect of an 
MSD septum trip, which is protected by a current 
surveillance and interlock but which could nonetheless 
produce a relative error of several 10-4.  
For the 0.1 % error no extra losses are observed in the 
extraction channel or dump line. For 1 % error most of 
the beam is dumped correctly, Fig. 5, with a vertical offset 
as expected. Fig. 6 shows that the MSD vacuum chamber 
intercepts some particles; there are also losses seen at the 
differential pumping device in the TD68 line. A few 
particles are even lost on the vertical dilution kickers. 
 
Figure 5: Sweep at TDE for 1% MSD error.  





















Figure 6  Losses along TD68 for 1 % MSD error. 
Q4R6 failure of 5 %. 
Q4 provides about 25 % of the deflection needed to 
extract the beam. The Q4 current is surveyed by the 
LBDS beam energy tracking system with a maximum 
error of about 1 %. The case was tested with MKD 
nominal kick and a large random error of 5 % applied to 
the Q4. No extra losses were seen in the extraction 
channel or dump line. 
Losses on the TCDQ system for asynchronous 
dump 
For an asynchronous dump the pattern of losses on the 
LHC ring elements between TCDS and TCDQ system is 
shown in Fig. 7. The losses are limited to the protection 
devices, as designed, with no losses on the Q4 magnet or 
the TCDQM device. 


















Figure 7: Losses in the LHC ring in LSS6 for an 
asynchronous dump. 
CONCLUSION 
MADX jobs have been set up to study the detailed 
aperture of the LBDS extraction system. These have been 
applied to different failure cases using a preliminary 
particle distribution with secondary halo. The efficiency 
and settings of the protection devices in shielding the 
local downstream elements was tested. The sections from 
the first Q4 to the TCDS and also from the MSD to the 
second Q4 seem to be well protected. No losses were seen 
before the TCDS; near the second Q4 all loses were found 
on protection elements for all cases. This confirms that 
the aperture in this region is correctly specified and 
defined. The MSD itself saw losses for some of the failure 
cases, and some losses on the differential vacuum 
pumping module in TD68 have also been observed. The 
MSDC chamber alignment from the database differs 
slightly from the specification (by 1 mm) which may 
explain the result. These cases will be investigated in 
more detail with more realistic and extensive particle 
distributions, and by ‘zooming’ in on the regions of 
interest, to keep the computation time low. The studies 
will be extended to include orbit errors and mechanical 
tolerances, and continued to track the small-angle 
particles, which stay inside the TCDQ aperture and are of 
interest for the collimation system and the LHC 
experiments. The tolerances on the settings of the 
protection devices will therefore also be included, in 
particular to determine the operational tolerances for the 
TCDQ protection devices. 
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